The New Divide: Wagner Group loyalties put to the test

In an exclusive interview with Vladimir Putin, the Russian business daily Kommersant reported that the Wagner Group is non-existent because Russia has no law that legalises the existence of PMCs. The key question is whether this comment by Putin holds any weight, not at all. The reality is that the Kremlin has a long-held view that PMCs are not legalised, are not officially recognised, and therefore do not exist – except, they do.

That all said, the most interesting point to note about Putin’s interview was his confirmation that a meeting between him and Wagner Group commanders, including Evgeny Prigozhin, occurred on 29 June 2023, five days after the ‘Wagner Rebellion’. During the meeting, Putin claimed to have offered Wagner Group commanders with employment options, including the previously reported offer of working under the direct command of callsign “Sedoi” [Grey Hair]. However, Putin claimed that all of the commanders except Prigozhin, were “nodding” their heads in agreement with Putin’s offer.

Putin is then quoted as saying that Prigozhin stated that the rank and file of the Wagner Group would disagree with such a decision by remarking “no, the guys don’t agree with this decision”.

To gain an understanding of what is potentially taking place in the Wagner Group, and what Putin’s comments actually mean, we should break things down bit-by-bit.

Where is Prigozhin?

On 14 July 2023, a photograph of Evgeny Prigozhin sitting in his underwear on a camp bed was uploaded to the Wagner Group Telegram channel. The photograph included a caption indicating that Prigozhin was located in the “Field camp of PMC “Wagner” on the territory of Belarus through the Ministry of Defense of Belarus”. The post added, “Belarusian sources today confirmed the start of the transfer of Wagner PMC to Belarus”.

Analysing the image, the Belarusian Hajun Project indicated on their Telegram channel that the metadata indicated that the image was created on 12 June 2023 at 07:24. However, the post was later edited and the image creation date was changed to July. Going further, the Belarusian Hajun Project indicated that if the image had been created on 12 July 2023, it would tie in nicely with earlier reports indicating that Prigozhin’s plane flew to Belarus for a third time on 11 July 2023, landing at Machulishchi airbase at 19:40. 15 minutes later, at 20:05, two Belarusian Air Force helicopters flew from Machulishchi to Osipovichi, the closest main city to the new Wagner Group camp located at Tsel.

The Belarusian Hajun Project further reported that on the following day, 12 July 2023, the same helicopters flew from Osipovichy and returned to Machulishchi, landing at 14:27. A couple of hours later, Prigozhin’s plane was then tracked leaving Machulichi, and returned to St. Petersburg.

Therefore, if the image in question was taken on 12 July 2023 at 07:23 a.m., this would further reinforce the assessment that Prigozhin likely flew from Russia to Belarus on the evening of 11 July 2023, slept overnight in Tsel, then returned to Russia the next day.

The image also dispels speculation amongst many media outlets that Prigozhin had either been killed or imprisoned after he met with Putin on 29 June 2023.

But, just because Prigozhin and elements of the Wagner Group now appear to have set the wheels in motion to establish themselves in Belarus does not necessarily reflect the realities of what may actually be taking place within the organisation.

Has the Wagner Group fully relocated to Belarus?

Yes and no. Elements of the Wagner Group have most certainly arrived at their new camp located in a former military garrison known as Tsel, located to the north Osipovichy district, Belarus. The timeline of events with regard to the relocation remains somewhat unclear. However, below shows the timeline of events that are currently understood:

What can we interpret from Putin’s meeting with Wagner Group commanders?

There are several points we can infer from Putin’s interview with Kommersant. Ultimately, we now know that Prigozhin and the Wagner Group have been offered a way back into the fold. However, all is far from forgiven.

Firstly, Putin likely recognises the capabilities that Wagner Group bring to the battlefield, especially when taking into account territorial gains in occupied eastern Ukraine such as Soledar and Bakhmut (especially). As such, he is likely reluctant to have the organisation disbanded altogether.

Secondly, Putin has probably accepted the explanation offered by the Wagner Commanders with regard to the ‘rebellion’ on 23 June 2023. That said, Putin’s offer of employment to the Wagner Group commanders can be seen as another measure to get the Wagner Group to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence and effectively render them under the Russian armed forces’ command and control. This is a red line for Prigozhin, and Putin knows this.

Thirdly, offering to bring the Wagner Group under the command of callsign ‘Sedoi’ is clearly intended to drive a wedge between the Wagner Group commanders and Prigozhin. Let’s not forget, Prigozhin has no military background and was likely to have been installed as the so-called ‘Orchestrator’ of the Wagner Group by Putin in the first place. Nevertheless, Putin’s offer is also a red line for Prigozhin, though Putin is probably aware that this may not be the case for other senior commanders.

Lastly, Putin is likely dangling a carrot to senior Wagner Group commanders except for Prigozhin at a time when the Wagner Group is returning weapons and equipment to the Russian armed forces. For his part, Putin’s likely message to senior Wagner Group commanders is that they should sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence and place callsign ‘Sedoi’ in charge. In return, the Wagner Group could have some of their weapons and equipment returned (according to Ministry of Defence quotas) and be permitted to return to eastern Ukraine. Otherwise, they chose to join Prigozhin in exile in Belarus with a far-limited role. With Putin’s offer in mind, this places senior Wagner Group commanders in a delicate position as their loyalties could now be put to the test.

Who is callsign ‘Sedoi’?

The literal translation for ‘Sedoi’ is ‘Grey Hair’, a callsign name associated with Andrei Nikolaevich Troshev, a retired police colonel who served as the a former commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) – a spetsnaz unit of the Russian National Guard. According to Myrotvorets, Troshev is a veteran of police special forces who served as an airborne artillery gunner in Afghanistan. For his service in Afghanistan, Troshev was awarded two Orders of the Red Star – a Soviet Union decoration for exceptional service. For service in Chechnya, he was awarded two Orders of Courage and a medal of the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, 2nd degree, according to Russian media.

Of particular note, in his interview with Kommersant, Putin indicated that “They [Wagner Group] would be led by the same person [Troshev] who has been their real commander all along”.

However, online reactions from Wagner Group supporters to this statement are visibly hostile. One user commenting speculated that Putin decided to offer Troshev overall command of the Wagner Group because he is considered Putin’s close confidant whose command responsibilities were purely symbolic.

Why would Putin choose Troshev over Dimitry Utkin?

This is where the situation becomes rather interesting because we still don’t know whether or not Dimitry Utkin attended the high-level meeting at the Kremlin on 29 June 2023. Moreover, Utkin’s current whereabouts remain unknown and speculation as to whether he is alive or dead remains rife.

Reports have indicated that Utkin was deployed to take charge of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa after he had recovered from an injury he sustained during fighting in Ukraine in June 2022. However, separate reports indicate that he may have died from his wounds.

Let’s assume that Utkin is dead and buried, it would likely be in the Wagner Group’s interests to maintain his legacy and lead others to believe that he was in fact alive and well. After all, callsign ‘Wagner’ or the ‘Dark Commander’ – as he is often referred to – is the founder of the Wagner Group. It is also evident from online communities that Utkin holds somewhat of a celebrity status amongst followers.

In February 2023, Wagner Group Telegram channels posted an image showing a Wagner Group journalist alongside Prigozhin and a masked male at the training facility in Molkino.

The caption associated with the image indicated that the masked individual was the ‘commander of a separate black banner, Wagner Order Corps’ – possibly, this was a reference to ‘the Dark Commander’ / Utkin.

However, Putin’s offer to the Wagner Group commanders on 29 June is especially interesting considering that he spoke of Troshev as being “their [the Wagner Group’s] real commander all along” even though Utkin created the Wagner Group in the first place. It further raises the question as to why Putin would choose Troshev over Utkin as Prigozhin’s successor.

That all said, let’s assume that Utkin is alive and well, it is assessed that Putin’s offer was also intended to drive a wedge between the Wagner Group commanders and Dimitry Utkin.

What is Prigozhin’s reaction to Putin’s offer?

So far, Prigozhin has yet to officially comment on Putin’s offer to the Wagner Group commanders during the high-level meeting on 29 July 2023. However, posts released on the Wagner Group Telegram channels provide us with a sense of Prigozhin’s thoughts.

In a lengthy post released on 15 July, it is claimed that before the 29 July meeting, a separate gathering occurred between Putin and the ‘internal political department’ of the Kremlin. The meeting was meant to decide on courses of action designed to discredit Prigozhin. The post went further to describe five proposals that were allegedly discussed during the meeting:

1. Plant military equipment, artillery, and ammunition inside Wagner Group facilities as proof that Prigozhin was lying about the shortage of ammunition within the Wagner Group.
2. Claim that Prigozhin sold equipment and ammunition to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
3. Expose Prigozhin’s lavish lifestyle in St. Petersburg.
4. Demonstrate that Prigozhin was a hired puppet, and that the Wagner Group was in fact commanded by others.
5. Suggest that Prigozhin was sexually perverted by showing his collection of wigs, makeup, and a false passport.

The Wagner Group Telegram channel went further to point out that all courses of action except for number two had been initiated by the Kremlin.

What happens next?

Undoubtedly, this is a million-dollar question open to many competing hypotheses and conjectures. The primary intelligence gap identified from Putin’s meeting on 29 June 2023 is that a consensus wasn’t reached. That said, it remains to be seen whether Prigozhin commands the loyalty of most Wagner Group commanders to the extent they agree to relocate to Belarus. Based on recent open-source reporting, it is evident that the Wagner Group is now conducting training activities in Belarus as per the mandate given to them by Alexander Lukashenko.

However, it is probable that the foundations for a split within the Wagner Group are beginning to emerge with Prigozhin and possibly Utkin on one side, and Troshev on the other. Although it is clear from online communities that Prigozhin commands the loyalty of newer fighters, veteran Wagner Group contractors have visibly responded in disgust towards the actions of the Wagner Group on 23 June 2023. Let’s not forget, veteran so-called ‘Wagnerites’ are mostly comprised of Russian veterans with long careers within the Russian armed forces. In stark contrast, newer fighters do not typically hold the same experience – in fact – many have no military experience whatsoever.

What could emerge over the coming weeks or months is a consolidation of veteran Wagner Group fighters and other PMCs that are aligned underneath the Russian Ministry of Defence to form a new formation of private volunteers – possibly commanded by Troshev and others. Could this group bear the name of the Wagner Group, probably not. The Wagner Group is a name that continues to be smeared by the Russian media and Putin will probably be eager to demonstrate that the Wagner Group is the poisoned chalice that turned its back on the motherland and ‘its perceived ‘patriotic cause’ in Ukraine.

Admittedly, a hostile takeover of the Wagner Group is not as easy as one may think. Let’s not forget that Prigozhin retains a controlling interest in the Concord group of companies in addition to several mining concessions in Africa. The latter of which Putin likely considers to be a strategic financial asset. Unless Putin can directly wrestle control of the mining contracts out of Prigozhin’s hands, then the former will have no choice but to do business with the latter. However, Prigozhin is likely aware that if he fails to hold on to his strategic interests in Africa, then he serves Putin with no purpose.

For now, at least, we are likely to see Wagner Group activities in Belarus continuing. However, they likely have a much smaller mandate that is limited to training the Belarusian armed forces. Most likely, Troshev is now in a position to consolidate veteran Wagner Group contractors under the Russian Ministry of Defence – as it is now in his interests to do just that. The choice for other senior Wagner Group commanders is where they place their loyalty.